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Welcome to Call to Decision
RED ALERT - Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai Attacks
"... The Indians will not be in
a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the
situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions."
We know that one clear goal or would be goal, of
the U.S. and its immediate allies, India not least, is to rid Pakistan
of its nuclear weapons. Certainly this is a huge crisis,
more so for all its implications. ac.
To: acfree@earthlink.net
Subject: RED ALERT - Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai
Attacks
Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2008 19:22:32 +0000
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PAL PILLAI/AFP/Getty Images
A fire in the dome of the Taj Hotel
in Mumbai on Nov. 26
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were
carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government
will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on
Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear
rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the
ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of
Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of
what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event
at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the
likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers
are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with
some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite
clearly that this was a carefully
planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the
Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that
the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held
accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law
enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the
public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power:
Pakistan.
In that case it can hold a nation-state
responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to
strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking
nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the
Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This
is not to say that there are no outside powers involved simply
that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim
there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India
and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002.
If the Pakistanis are understood to be
responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them
responsible, and that means they will have to take action in
retaliation otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic
credibility will plunge.
The shape of the crisis, then, will
consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to
suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in
Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and
public. This demand will come parallel
to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S.
President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find
itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be
threatening action deliberately vague but menacing along with
the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as
currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held
hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked.
If the attacks are traced to
Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of
inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In
2002 there was an attack
on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to
Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India
and Pakistan, in which the
United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified
Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the
Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the
demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have
a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively
and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such
pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The
Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the
Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major
concessions. Thus the crisis will
directly intersect U.S.
and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which
the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians
will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will
move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in
India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way,
India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events
point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but
within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign
powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive
destabilization is possible never a good thing with a nuclear
power.
This is thinking far ahead of the
curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we
don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims
and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically
that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and
since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough
to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a
crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on
the ground clarifies itself.
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